Patents and the Presumption of Conformity
Access to the law includes access to the harmonised standards it predicates. But is it right that those standards can include royalty-due patents (SEPs)?
If you have been following the progress of the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), you may have been intrigued to hear that the next step following publication of the Act as law in the Official Journal is the issue of a European Standards Request (ESR) to the three official European Standards Organisations (ESOs). What is that about? Well, a law like the CRA is extremely long and complex and conforming to it will involve a detailed analysis and a lot of legal advice.
Rather than forcing everyone individually to do that, the ESOs are instead sent a list of subjects that need proving and are asked to recommend a set of standards that, if observed, will demonstrate conformity with the law. This greatly simplifies things for everyone and leads to what the lawmakers call a “presumption of conformity”. You could go comply with the law based on your own research, but realistically that's impossible for almost everyone so you will instead choose to observe the harmonised standards supplied by the ESOs.
This change of purpose for standards is very significant. They have evolved from merely being a vehicle to promote interoperability in a uniform market – an optional tool for private companies that improves their product for their consumers – to being a a vehicle to prove legal compliance – a mandatory responsibility for all citizens.
That's all very well, but the three ESOs (ETSI, CENELEC and CEN) all have “IPR rules” that permit the private parties who work within them to embed in the standrds steps that are patented by those private companies. This arrangement is permitted by the European law that created the mechanism, Regulation 1025/2012 (in Annex II §4c). All three ESO's expressly tolerate this behaviour as long as the patents are then licensed to implementors of the standards on “Fair, Reasonable and Non Discriminatory” (FRAND) terms. None of those words is particularly well defined, and the consequence is that to implement the standards that emerge from the ESOs you may well need to retain counsel to understand your patent obligations and enable you to enter into a relationship with Europe's largest commercial entities to negotiate a license to those patents.
Setting aside the obvious problems this creates for open source software (where the need for such relationships broadly inhibits implementation), it is also a highly questionable challenge to our democracy. At the foundation of our fundamental rights is the absolute requirement that first, every citizen may know the law that governs them and secondly every citizen is freely able to comply if they choose. The Public.Resource.Org case shows us this principle also extends to standards that are expressly or effectively necessary for compliance with a given law.
But when these standards are allowed to have patents intentionally embodied within them by private actors for their own profit, citizens find themselves unable to practically conform to the law without specialist support and a necessary private relationship with the patent holders. While some may have considered this to be a tolerable compromise when the goal of standards was merely interoperability, it is clearly an abridgment of fundamental rights to condition compliance with the law on identifying and negotiating a private licensing arrangement for patents, especially those embedded intentionally in standards.
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